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Preface
On the Dynamic Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy . . . . . . . 1–15
R. Cellini and L. Lambertini
Abstract
The literature on the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy puts for-
ward the idea that a central bank may strategically exploit the first mover advantage
against the private sector, manipulating expectations so as to achieve a higher level
of employment and output. This view is questionable. The goal of the paper is
that once one takes into account that expectations cannot be considered as choice
variables, and the rule of expectation formation is common knowledge to all play-
ers, there may no longer be room for time inconsistency of monetary policy. The
paper shows that the dynamic version of the basic model used in this literature
is an optimal control model yielding a time consistent and stable solution to the
central banker’s problem, where prices are stable and the output reaches the full
employment level in steady state. Then this idea is extended including a strate-
gic private sector, which transforms the initial setup into a differential game. The
open-loop Nash equilibrium is found, and it is proved that this game has a time con-
sistent Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium with the bank leading, where, however,
the bank cannot gain as compared to the simultaneous game. In the Stackelberg
game in which the private sector leads, inflation arises in equilibrium, and output
is below the full employment level. It is shown that in our setup optimal monetary
policy is indeed to be time consistent, although it does not necessarily lead to the
full stabilisation of prices. This holds irrespective of whether the game is played
simultaneously or sequentially.
Uniform (0, 1) Two-person Poker Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–37
C. Ferguson, T. Ferguson and C. Gawargy
Abstract
The study of two-person zero-sum poker models with independent uniform (0,1)
hands goes back to Borel and von Neumann. E. Borel discusses a model of poker in
Chapter 5, ”Le jeu de poker”, of his book Applications aux Jeux de Hasard (1938).
Von Neumann presents his analysis of a similar model of poker in the seminal book
on game theory by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of games and
economic behavior (1944). Most subsequent work on these models has been to
extend the Borel model to allow several rounds of betting or more bet sizes. The
von Neumann model, though more closely tied to actual play, is harder to treat
mathematically. In this paper we solve several extensions to the von Neumann
model. See Ferguson and Ferguson (2003) for a discussion and comparison of these
two models.
A Tax Game in a Cournot Duopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39–47
A. Galegov, A. Garnaev
Abstract
In many countries the tax rate depends on the tax base. In Russia in 2003, so
called simplified tax system, which consists of two tax rates (6 and 15 percents),
was introduced in order to support small business. That is why some firms face up
a problem of choosing one of them: either the pure profit tax rate (when firm pays
tax from total revenue minus total cost) or the total revenue tax rate (when firm
pays tax from total revenue). The total revue tax rate (6 percent) is less than the
pure profit tax rate (15 percent), because the tax base in the first case is greater.
In the environment of competition, when there are few firms producing a ho-
mogeneous good for the market, the problem of choice becomes a game-theoretical
problem since every firm should take into consideration behavior of its rival. We will
call this situation a tax game. The aim of this paper is to generalize the problem of
choice of the tax rate as well as the criteria of this choice for the competition case.
In this paper we consider two plots of this game in the Cournot settings. The first
one is a two stage game. On first stage firms plan their production in the Cournot
settings for each combination of possible tax rates, while on the second stage they
decide what tax rate will be better to use. The second plot is the one stage game
where the firms choose the tax rate by optimal way after setting production plan.
On a Corruption Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49–58
A. Garnaev, A. Toricin
Abstract
This paper deals with the analytical framework outlined by J. Buchanan and
Y.J. Yoon (2000) to explore the symmetric ”tragedies of the commons and the
anti-commons” which was applied by A. Canavese (2004) to study the relationship
between institutions and corruption. The aim of the paper is to generalize the
Canavese model for the n corrupt agents case and for the case where there is a
leader between the corrupted agents. We consider the effects of the corruption
punishment on the resource allocation. Two ways of corruption punishment to
discourage corrupt agents are studied. It is shown that corruption punishment based
on the earnings collected from the bribes produces better allocation of resources than
sanctions based on the number of corrupt acts committed. Also it is shown that if
the corruption system has a hierarchical structure it can be easy destructed applying
less facilities compare to less structured corruption system.
The Quiet Accumulation Game on a Linear Graph a Special Case 59–77
K. Kikuta, W. Ruckle
Abstract
A quiet accumulation game on a linear graph is formulated as a two person
zero-sum game. Upper and lower bounds for the value of the game are given as well
as pure strategies which assure those bounds by mixing them. Numerical examples
are solved when the number of nodes is small.
Monopolistic Payoffs in Cournot Oligopolies as a Result of Misspecified
Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79–90
J.B. Krawczyk , F. Szidarovszky
Abstract
We study dynamic oligopolies under imperfect knowledge of the demand func-
tion. We show that if firms know the shape of the demand function but misspecify
its scale they can enjoy stable monopolistic payoffs, which can reach the monopolis-
tic levels. This may be exploited by firms with perfect knowledge of demand to drive
the underinformed competitor’s output down and to reap the benefits of produc-
ing more than under the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Independently, this can also
explain why some apparently competitive economies may produce at monopolistic
levels.
Game and Control Problems with Discontinuous Switches of Constraints
for Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91–122
S.S. Kumkov, A.N. Zharinov
Abstract
A nonlinear zero-sum differential game is analyzed. The problem is to construct
maximal stable bridge W(v, M), that is, a set maximal by inclusion, where from
the first player guarantees reaching the terminal set M at the instant ? despite
of actions of the second player. The paper suggests a numerical algorithm for
constructing attainability sets for nonlinear control and game problems in the plane.
The control constraint depends on the phase vector, and this dependence can be
discontinuous. Results of computation of some models are given and supported by
several illustrative examples. Formalization of the control problem and the theoretic
proofs of its reasonability are given. Possibilities and difficulties in justification of
the algorithm for differential games are discussed.
Numerical Study of the ”Homicidal Chauffeur” Differential Game with
the Reinforced Pursuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123–152
V.S. Patsko, V.L. Turova
Abstract
One of well-known problems in the theory of differential games is a ”homicidal
chauffer” problem proposed by R. Isaacs. The pursuer P (a car) and the evader E (a
pedestrian) are moving in the plane. The linear velocity of the car is constant. The
angular velocity of rotation of the linear velocity vector is bounded which means that
the radius of turn of the car is bounded from below. The pedestrian is a non-linear
object that can change the value and direction of his velocity instantaneously. The
maximal possible value of the velocity is specified. By a given circular neighborhood
of his current geometric position, player P tries to capture player E as soon as
possible. The paper is devoted to the investigation of a time-optimal differential
game in which the pursuer possesses increased control capabilities comparing to
the classical homicidal chauffeur problem. Namely, the pursuer steers not only the
angular velocity of turn but can additionally change the magnitude of his linear
velocity. For such a new variant of the dynamics with non-scalar control of the
pursuer, a complete description of families of semipermeable curves is given and
the dependence of the structure of level sets of the value function on a parameter
that defines the bound on the magnitude of the pursuers velocity is explored by
numerical methods.
Equilibrium in N-Players Competitive Silent Games of Timing 153–166
M. Sakaguchi, V.V. Mazalov
Abstract
The paper deals with the shooting contest for n players, competitive prediction
of a random variable and war-games of attrition. The Nash equilibrium is derived
among mixed strategies as a solution of the differential equation.
A Strategic Analysis of Product and Process Innovation with
Spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167–177
L. Shravan
Abstract
We develop a two-stage non-cooperative R&D game of process and product
innovation in a duopoly model which is distinct from Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) in
the following way. Unlike the latter, we allow for process spillovers from which only
the follower benefits in the model so that the follower’s marginal cost of production
is reduced not only by its own process innovation but also by a fraction of the
leader’s process investment . At the first stage of the game, the duopolists (the
leader and the follower) will engage in product and process R&D. While product
R&D is stochastic (in the sense that it realizes with a probability) and leads to
the instantaneous discovery of a new product which leads to an outward shift of
the firm’s demand schedule, process R&D reduces the marginal cost of production
with certainty. The two firms compete in the product market in the second stage.
As in Yin and Zuscovitch (1998), results are derived by assuming that in the first
stage the firm chooses product innovation taking process innovation as given and
vice versa and finally the impact of spillovers on product and process strategies is
found. Our results show that the spillover rate plays a critical role in analyzing
the interplay between process and product innovations. The central contribution of
our work is to offer a conceptual model for determining the impact of spillovers on
the industry’s innovation level and also for understanding the factors which might
cause a firm to change its strategy from process to product when the spillover rate
becomes small. Our results demonstrate that there exists a negative relationship
between the spillover parameter and the product innovations of both the leader and
follower. This suggests that we may observe switching behavior in an industry when
the spillover rate becomes small.
Values for TU Games with Linear Cooperation Structures . . . . 179–191
E. Yanovskaya
Abstract
Aumann and Dreze (1975) were the first to introduce TU games with coalitional
structures, into the study of value. They characterized the value assigning to each
TU game with a coalitional structure the payoff vector consisting of the Shapley
values (1953) of subgames defined by coalitions of the partition. Owen (1977) ex-
tended the Shapley value to games with a coalitional structure by a restriction of
symmetry. Winter (1989) extended this approach to the games with an hierarchy
of a finite sequence of partitions. In this paper we extend the Owen and the Winter
values to a class of TU games with linear cooperation structures. A linear coopera-
tion structure given exogenously means that if some players can cooperate with two
non-intersecting coalitions then the coalitions cannot cooperate behind the players’
backs. The symmetry across coalitions axiom used in Owen/Winter’s characteriza-
tions of their values is not well defined for cooperation structures with intersecting
coalitions. Thus, for such structures we add a new axiom stating independence
of the values of coalitions whose players cannot be placed consecutively w.r.t. the
linear order of players in which the coalitions of a given structure have no ”holes”.
In the paper an axiomatization of the value for TU games with linear cooperation
structures is given. A comparison of this value with the Myerson value for the class
of connected cooperation graphs being simple chains is discussed.
Oligopoly Competition under Environmental Design . . . . . . . . . . 193–206
N.A. Zenkevich, A.V. Zyatchin
Abstract
The present research deals with a problem of environmental design by means of a
stochastic differential game. Firms competing a la Cournot over time produce their
outputs which pollute the air. The paper studies two cases: perfect and imperfect
information. In the first case, solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, the
Nash equilibrium in the stochastic differential game is obtained in an explicit form.
In case of imperfect information, similar technique is applied, which provides the
Bayesian equilibrium. Illustrative examples are presented.
A Continuous Model of N-Person Prisoners’ Dilemma . . . . . . . . 207–242
J. Zhao, M.N. Szilagyi and F. Szidarovszky
Abstract
The model in this paper can be considered as the extended version of the clas-
sical N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma: a continuous N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma. In
the model each agent is assumed to be a mixture of six major personality types, and
their state space is continuous. If continuous time scales are assumed, then the dy-
namism of the society can be modeled by a system of nonlinear ordinary differential
equations. In the case of discrete time scales, our model is formulated as a system
of difference equations. In certain special cases, our continuous model is equivalent
to the discrete state models discussed earlier in the literature; therefore the results
are the same. In general, the contin- uous state models generate different answers
than the corresponding discrete state models. Our model could be deterministic or
stochastic, however the discrete model is always stochastic. The update of state in
the continuous model depends on the agent’s previous state, and the new state can
be any value between 0 and 1. In contrast, the update of state in the discrete model
can be only change from 0 to 1, from 1 to 0, or remain unchanged. An agent based
simulation process is developed and applied to describe the dynamic changes in the
structure of the society, as well as to analyze the long-term behavior of the agents.
